From Newsgroup: comp.theory

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp
or Google groups link to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was:
"that is not how we memorized it".
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On Fri, 05 Dec 2025 19:38:09 -0600, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp or Google groups link
to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was: "that is not how we memorized
it".

If H reports non-halting then D halts ergo H is not a halt decider.

/HAL
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/6/2025 7:17 AM, HAL 9000 wrote:

On Fri, 05 Dec 2025 19:38:09 -0600, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp or Google groups link
to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was: "that is not how we memorized
it".

If H reports non-halting then D halts ergo H is not a halt decider.

/HAL

https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/Halt7.c
HHH on line 1081
DD on line 1355

typedef int (*ptr)();
int HHH(ptr P);

int DD()
{
int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
if (Halt_Status)
HERE: goto HERE;
return Halt_Status;
}

int main()
{
HHH(DD);
}

DD simulated by HHH (according to the semantics
of the C programming language) cannot possibly
reach its own simulated "return" statement final
halt state while being simulated by HHH.

This is the correct measure of the behavior that
the input to HHH(DD) actually specifies.

I show all of the detailed steps of exactly how
the halting problem itself is flatly incorrect to
require a halt decider to report on the behavior
of DD executed from main when this is not the
behavior that the input to HHH(DD) actually specifies.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398375553_Halting_Problem_Proof_Counter-Example_is_Isomorphic_to_the_Liar_Paradox
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/05/2025 05:38 PM, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp
or Google groups link to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was:
"that is not how we memorized it".

"Overgeneralizations are generally un-sound."


Now, as somebody who's interested in contrary opinions,
yet not contrarians for contrarianisms sake,
and somebody who's demonstrated that various widely
held opinions in logical fields like logic are questionable,
and both fraglich and fragwurdig (dubitable and question-raising),
and indeed have some what may be "more true" implications,
after something like Goedelian incompleteness some
kind of super-Goedelian completeness,
as somebody interested in rational contrary opinions
for conscientious reasonings' sake, has that
usual notions of the constructible vis-a-vis universal
to be fair, are extra-ordinary.

Don't get me wrong, there's the great hypocrisy of
the ordinary Russell-ian retro-thesis that has readily
demonstrable that adherence to it is an "inductively sound"
yet "generally un-sound overgeneralization", so that
there's a taint of guilt on any soi-disant logician
who mistook "isolation and significance" for "completion
and relevance".


Or, as was written around here somewhere
"hone-ey swah key maal ee ponce", yet,
you know, "heal thyself".


If you really want extra-Goedelian completeness then
it demands a rather thorough account of theory and
"the generally sound universal overgeneralization".


--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/6/2025 10:28 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 12/05/2025 05:38 PM, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp
or Google groups link to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was:
"that is not how we memorized it".

"Overgeneralizations are generally un-sound."

Now, as somebody who's interested in contrary opinions,
yet not contrarians for contrarianisms sake,
and somebody who's demonstrated that various widely
held opinions in logical fields like logic are questionable,
and both fraglich and fragwurdig (dubitable and question-raising),
and indeed have some what may be "more true" implications,
after something like Goedelian incompleteness some
kind of super-Goedelian completeness,
as somebody interested in rational contrary opinions
for conscientious reasonings' sake, has that
usual notions of the constructible vis-a-vis universal
to be fair, are extra-ordinary.

Don't get me wrong, there's the great hypocrisy of
the ordinary Russell-ian retro-thesis that has readily
demonstrable that adherence to it is an "inductively sound"
yet "generally un-sound overgeneralization", so that
there's a taint of guilt on any soi-disant logician
who mistook "isolation and significance" for "completion
and relevance".

Or, as was written around here somewhere
"hone-ey swah key maal ee ponce", yet,
you know, "heal thyself".

If you really want extra-Goedelian completeness then
it demands a rather thorough account of theory and
"the generally sound universal overgeneralization".

I have never considered any kind of overgeneralization.
So I need much more elaboration before I can respond.

My complete system would simply be the complete set of
atomic facts of the actual world and everything that
can be semantically entailed from them. Like Saul Kripke
already proved self-referential paradoxes cannot
be derived from such a system.

https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

I try to as much as possible only form conclusions on
the basis of semantic logical entailment from
self-evidently true expressions of language.
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/06/2025 08:58 AM, olcott wrote:

On 12/6/2025 10:28 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 12/05/2025 05:38 PM, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp
or Google groups link to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was:
"that is not how we memorized it".

"Overgeneralizations are generally un-sound."


Now, as somebody who's interested in contrary opinions,
yet not contrarians for contrarianisms sake,
and somebody who's demonstrated that various widely
held opinions in logical fields like logic are questionable,
and both fraglich and fragwurdig (dubitable and question-raising),
and indeed have some what may be "more true" implications,
after something like Goedelian incompleteness some
kind of super-Goedelian completeness,
as somebody interested in rational contrary opinions
for conscientious reasonings' sake, has that
usual notions of the constructible vis-a-vis universal
to be fair, are extra-ordinary.

Don't get me wrong, there's the great hypocrisy of
the ordinary Russell-ian retro-thesis that has readily
demonstrable that adherence to it is an "inductively sound"
yet "generally un-sound overgeneralization", so that
there's a taint of guilt on any soi-disant logician
who mistook "isolation and significance" for "completion
and relevance".


Or, as was written around here somewhere
"hone-ey swah key maal ee ponce", yet,
you know, "heal thyself".


If you really want extra-Goedelian completeness then
it demands a rather thorough account of theory and
"the generally sound universal overgeneralization".

I have never considered any kind of overgeneralization.
So I need much more elaboration before I can respond.

My complete system would simply be the complete set of
atomic facts of the actual world and everything that
can be semantically entailed from them. Like Saul Kripke
already proved self-referential paradoxes cannot
be derived from such a system.

https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

I try to as much as possible only form conclusions on
the basis of semantic logical entailment from
self-evidently true expressions of language.

A complete ontology sounds pretty general, ...,
not much more general than that.

First of all you need to eliminate the "material implication"
or the "quasi-modal" logic more broadly, then what gets involved
is the consideration of paradox-free reason _after_ confronting
the paradoxes of logic, which are found simply results of competing
rulialities in real mathematical structures, that mere inductive
inference will always fail to find, while though that a wider, fuller
dialectic of the deductive inference may relate to real mathematical
structures of the continuous and infinite and about motion and time,
then to arrive at the "extra-ordinary" of logic, "non-standard" as
sometimes it's called, since otherwise it's just a retro-finitist
retro-thesis.

Saying "never" is a usual overgeneralization, and it's (qualifiedly)
never scientific, even saying "but" is a usual overgeneralization,
instead making for "yet".

The quasi-modal logic has neither entailment not monotonicity.
It thinks it does, though, ..., yet when confronted with a simple
enough opposite assertion also thinks it doesn't, then for the
greater analytical bridges to arrive at how to sort that out.



Of course, most rebuttals to things I say on Usenet are
refuted. Rebuttals aren't necessarily refutations anyways.

Kripke, ..., maybe you'd like some Gentzen instead, yet, Sheffer.





--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/7/2025 1:16 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 12/06/2025 08:58 AM, olcott wrote:

On 12/6/2025 10:28 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

On 12/05/2025 05:38 PM, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp
or Google groups link to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was:
"that is not how we memorized it".

"Overgeneralizations are generally un-sound."


Now, as somebody who's interested in contrary opinions,
yet not contrarians for contrarianisms sake,
and somebody who's demonstrated that various widely
held opinions in logical fields like logic are questionable,
and both fraglich and fragwurdig (dubitable and question-raising),
and indeed have some what may be "more true" implications,
after something like Goedelian incompleteness some
kind of super-Goedelian completeness,
as somebody interested in rational contrary opinions
for conscientious reasonings' sake, has that
usual notions of the constructible vis-a-vis universal
to be fair, are extra-ordinary.

Don't get me wrong, there's the great hypocrisy of
the ordinary Russell-ian retro-thesis that has readily
demonstrable that adherence to it is an "inductively sound"
yet "generally un-sound overgeneralization", so that
there's a taint of guilt on any soi-disant logician
who mistook "isolation and significance" for "completion
and relevance".


Or, as was written around here somewhere
"hone-ey swah key maal ee ponce", yet,
you know, "heal thyself".


If you really want extra-Goedelian completeness then
it demands a rather thorough account of theory and
"the generally sound universal overgeneralization".

I have never considered any kind of overgeneralization.
So I need much more elaboration before I can respond.

My complete system would simply be the complete set of
atomic facts of the actual world and everything that
can be semantically entailed from them. Like Saul Kripke
already proved self-referential paradoxes cannot
be derived from such a system.

https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/
files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf


I try to as much as possible only form conclusions on
the basis of semantic logical entailment from
self-evidently true expressions of language.

A complete ontology sounds pretty general, ...,
not much more general than that.

First of all you need to eliminate the "material implication"

Yes I think that I discovered that.

A deductive argument is said to be valid if
and only if it takes a form that makes it
impossible for the premises to be true and
the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to
be invalid. https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

This seems to stupidly allow false conclusions
to be drawn from false premises and still be
considered valid.

My first incremental change would require
a conclusion to be a necessary consequence of
all of its premises. I would use the modal
logic necessarily operator □ as a binary
operator. H1,..., Hm □ C to adapt Mendelson.

The next change is much larger. I would use
Rudolf Carnap / Richard Montague Meaning
Postulates that can mathematically anything
that can be expressed in natural language
(such as English).

declarative
interrogative
imperative
exclamatory
The entire body of general knowledge would be stored
in a knowledge ontology as formalized natural language. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)

We end up with something like this fully populated with
the set of basic facts and the relations between them.

Kurt Gödel in his 1944 Russell's mathematical logic gave
the following definition of the "theory of simple types"
in a footnote:

By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine
which says that the objects of thought (or, in
another interpretation, the symbolic expressions)
are divided into types, namely: individuals,
properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
(with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and
that sentences of the form: " a has the property
φ ", " b bears the relation R to c ", etc. are
meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together. Mixed types (such as classes
containing individuals and classes as elements)
and therefore also transfinite types (such as
the class of all classes of finite types) are
excluded. That the theory of simple types suffices
for avoiding also the epistemological paradoxes
is shown by a closer analysis of these.
(Cf. Ramsey 1926 and Tarski 1935, p. 399).".[24]

[24] page 455 https://lawrencecpaulson.github.io/papers/Russells-mathematical-logic.pdf

or the "quasi-modal" logic more broadly, then what gets involved
is the consideration of paradox-free reason _after_ confronting
the paradoxes of logic,

Yes I have thoroughly done that, two different ways.
Paradox proves that our reasoning is somehow incorrect.
One of these ways is similar to Saul Kripke

https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1358/files/2019/04/Outline-of-a-Theory-of-Truth.pdf

Here is my way of saying that. Paradox cannot be derived
by applying semantic logical entailment on the basis
of a complete and finite set of atomic facts.

Here is the other way the eliminates Paradox of self-reference
This short Prolog shows the error of the Liar Paradox
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

This means that the directed graph of the evaluation
sequence has a cycle meaning that the evaluation of the
Liar Paradox cannot possibly be resolved to a truth
value, thus never was a truth bearer or a proposition.

It expands to this: (and never terminates) not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))))

which are found simply results of competing
rulialities in real mathematical structures, that mere inductive
inference will always fail to find, while though that a wider, fuller dialectic of the deductive inference may relate to real mathematical structures of the continuous and infinite and about motion and time,
then to arrive at the "extra-ordinary" of logic, "non-standard" as
sometimes it's called, since otherwise it's just a retro-finitist retro-thesis.

The set of atomic facts and relations between them is finite.

Saying "never" is a usual overgeneralization, and it's (qualifiedly)
never scientific, even saying "but" is a usual overgeneralization,
instead making for "yet".

There will never be a coherent geometric object that
simultaneously has all of the properties of a geometric
circle and a geometric square in the same two dimensional
plane. In other words there will never be any square circles.

The quasi-modal logic has neither entailment not monotonicity.
It thinks it does, though, ..., yet when confronted with a simple
enough opposite assertion also thinks it doesn't, then for the
greater analytical bridges to arrive at how to sort that out.

I would need specific examples of this to understand it better.
I have never heard of quasi-modal logic and when I looked it
up this did not help.

Of course, most rebuttals to things I say on Usenet are
refuted. Rebuttals aren't necessarily refutations anyways.

Most rebuttals of my work are anchored in pure rhetoric
utterly bereft of any supporting reasoning. In 21 years
of recorded USENET posts in sci.logic and comp.theory
still available on GigaNews and Google Groups no one
has ever pointed out any mistake larger than a
typographical error.

The search interface for Google Groups has been greatly
improved. I can search for all of my posts of a specific
year. On Thunderbird I can search for all of my posts
sorted by date.

From Thunderbird and GigaNews
sci.logic 24,067 posts since On 4/18/2004 11:14 AM

Alan Turing's Halting Problem is incorrectly formed (PART-TWO)
comp.theory 40,005 posts since On 6/23/2004 9:34 PM

The first post that GigaNews has is my proof that the
halting problem counter-example input is isomorphic
to the Liar Paradox.

Might fill in the gaps https://usenetarchives.com/threads.php?id=comp.theory&y=0&r=0&p=598 https://usenetarchives.com/threads.php?id=sci.logic&y=0&r=0&p=354

Kripke, ..., maybe you'd like some Gentzen instead, yet, Sheffer.

--
Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.<br><br>

This required establishing a new foundation<br>
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On Sat, 06 Dec 2025 07:49:55 -0600, olcott wrote:

On 12/6/2025 7:17 AM, HAL 9000 wrote:

On Fri, 05 Dec 2025 19:38:09 -0600, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp or Google groups link
to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was: "that is not how we
memorized it".

If H reports non-halting then D halts ergo H is not a halt decider.

/HAL

https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/Halt7.c HHH on line 1081
DD on line 1355

typedef int (*ptr)();
int HHH(ptr P);

int DD()
{
int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
if (Halt_Status)
HERE: goto HERE;
return Halt_Status;
}

int main()
{
HHH(DD);
}

DD simulated by HHH (according to the semantics of the C programming language) cannot possibly reach its own simulated "return" statement
final halt state while being simulated by HHH.

This is the correct measure of the behavior that the input to HHH(DD) actually specifies.

I show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the halting problem
itself is flatly incorrect to require a halt decider to report on the behavior of DD executed from main when this is not the behavior that the input to HHH(DD) actually specifies.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/

398375553_Halting_Problem_Proof_Counter- Example_is_Isomorphic_to_the_Liar_Paradox

If HHH reports non-halting then DD halts ergo HHH is not a halt decider.

/HAL

--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.theory

On 12/7/2025 12:07 PM, HAL 9000 wrote:

On Sat, 06 Dec 2025 07:49:55 -0600, olcott wrote:

On 12/6/2025 7:17 AM, HAL 9000 wrote:

On Fri, 05 Dec 2025 19:38:09 -0600, olcott wrote:

Not one person can post a single date/time stamp or Google groups link >>>> to show otherwise.

The strongest of these fake rebuttals was: "that is not how we
memorized it".

If H reports non-halting then D halts ergo H is not a halt decider.

/HAL

https://github.com/plolcott/x86utm/blob/master/Halt7.c HHH on line 1081
DD on line 1355

typedef int (*ptr)();
int HHH(ptr P);

int DD()
{
int Halt_Status = HHH(DD);
if (Halt_Status)
HERE: goto HERE;
return Halt_Status;
}

int main()
{
HHH(DD);
}

DD simulated by HHH (according to the semantics of the C programming
language) cannot possibly reach its own simulated "return" statement
final halt state while being simulated by HHH.

This is the correct measure of the behavior that the input to HHH(DD)
actually specifies.

I show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the halting problem
itself is flatly incorrect to require a halt decider to report on the
behavior of DD executed from main when this is not the behavior that the
input to HHH(DD) actually specifies.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/

398375553_Halting_Problem_Proof_Counter- Example_is_Isomorphic_to_the_Liar_Paradox

If HHH reports non-halting then DD halts ergo HHH is not a halt decider.

/HAL

I have sound deductive inference on the basis of
accepted definitions that correctly refutes that
requirement. This is the definition that the
halting problem itself violates.

Turing machine deciders only compute a mapping from
their [finite string] inputs to an accept or reject
state on the basis that this [finite string] input
specifies or fails to specify a semantic or syntactic
property.

All the details are exaplained here.

Halting Problem Proof Counter-Example is
Isomorphic to the Liar Paradox
https://philpapers.org/archive/OLCHPP-3.pdf
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott<br><br>

My 28 year goal has been to make <br>
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.<br><br>

This required establishing a new foundation<br>
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2